The career-horizon problem in capital investments for lone-founder and long-tenure acquirer CEOs in their final career stage

In this study, we apply organizational identification theory to enrich our knowledge of the career-horizon problem when CEOs are approaching retirement. The extant literature suggests that the closer a CEO is to retirement, the more likely she or he is to avoid long-term firm investments. Focusing on capital investments, we argue that the distinctive organizational identification with the firm of lone-founder CEOs and long-tenure acquirer CEOs can moderate the likelihood that the closer a CEO is to retirement, the more likely she or he is to avoid capital investments. We test and validate our hypotheses on a sample of CEOs in S&P 1500 non-financial firms between 1999 and 2010. This article contributes to the literature on CEO career horizons by providing a new and more fine-grained perspective on the important question of how different types of CEOs consider capital investments and the future of their firms as they approach retirement.

Reference:

Chittima Silberzahn and Jean-Luc Arrègle. Forthcoming. The career-horizon problem in capital investments for lone-founder and long-tenure acquirer CEOs in their final career stage, Strategic Organization, first published 19 July 2018: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1476127018789594

2018-08-22T10:15:23+00:00 By |

About the Author:

Jean-Luc Arregle
Jean-Luc Arrègle is a Professor at EMLYON Business school. He teaches Strategy and International Strategy. His research interests are semi-globalisation strategies, MNEs FDI location, family firms' strategies and the roles of institutions in firms' strategic decisions. He serves on the editorial board or editorial review board of several academic journals (Journal of International Business Studies, Strategic Organization, MIR, RFG...). He has published articles in several international academic journals.

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